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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COLITA WILLIAMS and MAE
WILLIAMS,
Dependants of EARL RAE WILLIAMS, Deceased,
Plaintiffs
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, MESA DRILLERS and
EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COMPANY

Case No.
10273

Defendants
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
DISPOSITION SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS
The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Mesa
Drillers, and Employers Casualty Company seek that
the Utah Supreme Court confirm the Order and Findings
of the Industrial Commission denying Plaintiffs' Claim
for death benefits (R 153, 154) and further affirming
the Order denying a rehearing of the Industrial Commission on November 4, 1964 (R 158).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Decedent was employed by Mesa Drillers near Blanding, Utah, on or about July 3, 1957. At this time a commercial mud mix know as Northern Mud was used
containing a My-lo-jel preservation. My-lo-jel preservative contained paraformaldehyde which when dissolved in water released a toxic formaldehyde. (R. 4, 23)
Formaldehyde, depending on concentration, can cause
irritations to the mucous membranes and may, when
exposure is extreme, cause chronic bronchitis and may
lead to pneumonia. However, for such a condition to
exist, it would be necessary for an individual to have
been exposed to such a degree that he would not voluntarily stand by and allow the exposure to continue. Or
in other words, the material is sufficiently irritating,
that anyone capable of doing so would immediately leave
the area. The only conditions under which severe effects
are likely to occur would be if the individual were confined in such a way that he could not escape or if he
were overcome and could not escape. (R. 144, 145).
The basic facts of the alleged exposure and accident
relied on by Plaintiffs were largely related by a Mr.
Earl B. Clark and by a Mr. LeRoy Ramey. The testimony
of Earl B. Clark and LeRoy Ramey go into great detail
concerning the manner in which the deceased was required to work in closed shed, mixing the Northern Mud
material, how he was exposed to the dust of the mixture,
how the dust was irritating to the skin of the deceased,
how Earl Clark kicked the sides off the shed in order to
make for better ventilation for the deceased and how
Earl Clark washed the powder residue of the mix off
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of the deceased. (R 68, 69, 70, 71, 84, 85, 86, 80, 73).
The driller on the job, Buster Copeland, provided a
signed statement in which he indicated that Williams
had worekd for the Company for approximately three
weeks. During the last week Williams worked he had the
ful and was sick. Copeland noticed that he was taikng
pills every day. On the last day he worked, Copeland
noticed that he was sick, and on the way in from work he
vomited. At no time while Williams worked for Mesa
Drillers did he ever complain of anything on the job
causing him to get sick. (R 138)
Copeland, as foreman, first knew of Williams being
sick in the hospital the day after hospitalization occurred.
The foreman also saw Williams at his house several days
afterwards and Williams said nothing about being made
ill on the job. (R 139).
The alleged exposure evidently occurred on July 3,
1957. The parties returned to work on July 4th and 5th,
and returning home from work on July 5th, Williams
became ill, (R 138) and was that evening admitted to the
hospital (R 97). Williams was examined in the hospital
by Dr. Charles Massion. When Dr. Massion was asked
about any reference to exposure to a chemical substance,
he could not remember any reference being made by
Williams (R 7).
Decedent was released from the hospital on July 9,
1957, and begun a journey with his wife to his home
in Texas. In route at Levelland, Texas, the Decedent died
and Dr. Barnes, the attending physician attributed death
to a coronary occlusion (R 35).
In interpreting the testimony given, the Industrial

4
Commission undoubtedly weighed the testimony given
by LeRoy Ramey, Earl B. Clark and one of the Plaintiffs,
Colita Williams. Mr. Ramey testified to many of the
details of the exposure and accident. The exposure and
accident exidently all occured on July 3rd 1957 (R 65-83).
The daily drilling report from Mesa Drilling Company
for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th days of July bears the
signatures of the various men who worekd on the job
and the number of hours worked on the respective days.
The work record shows that LeRoy Ramey did not work
on July 3rd when he testified he was there and saw the
details of the accident. It also shows that the Decedent,
Mr. Earl Williams, did work on the 4th of July and so did
Mr. Ramey, and yet there is no testimony adduced as
to anything that happened on the 4th of July, and the
parties, in fact, testify that they did not work on the 4th
of July. The work record shows that they worked eight
hours (R 140, 141) and Defendant's exhibit 1).
Mr. Clark testified that he was a former husband of
Mrs. Colita Williams (R 89).
Based on the record accumulated by the Industrial
Commission, on the Medical Panel's report, the hearing
on the Medical Panel's Report, and a rehearing, the Com·
mission entered its order on September 23, 1964.
The Defendants allege that the evidence adduced in
the trial is sufficient to sustain the findings of the In·
dustrial Commission, that the Industrial Commission did
not act arbitrarily and capriciously, and did not exceed
any of its powers. The Defendants further allege that the
findings of the Medical Panel were based upon supposition
and upon questionable testimony of LeRoy Ramey who
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according to the work record was not even present, Earl
Clark, former husband of the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff
herself, whose only contact with the accident was what
the deceased allegedly told her about what accurred.
It is interesting to note that those things the deceased
allegedly told his wife about the occurrence of the
accident were never repeated by the deceased to the
doctors who attended him.
In the Plaintiffs argument it is pointed out that certain
findings and conclusions could have been drawn by the
Commission. The Defendants admit that it would have
been possible to arrive at the conclusions and findings
as set forth by the Plaintiffs if the Commission were to
accept all of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in the
case, and if the Commission were to ignore all of the
evidence by the Defendants. The Commission is entitled
to base its conclusions on acceptable evidence from disinterested parties, and in so doing, is in no way being
arbitrary or capricious.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT IN ERROR IN
REJECTING THE MEDICAL PANEL'S REPORT.
On March 25, 1960, the Industrial Commission wrote
to M. Blaine Peterson, offering to submit the matter to
a Medical Panel, if the parties could stipulate on the
facts (R 14). No stipulation was actually made on the
facts, and together with other documents submitted to
the medical panel, was an unsigned statement made by
the Plaintiff, Calita Williams, wife of the deceased. The
unsigned statement is extraordinarily detailed and de-
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scriptive, particularly from one who does not purport
to have been anywhere near the ecene where the accident
or exposure took place. Among other things, the statement stated: "He was overcome by the poisonous fumes
almost to the extent of unconsciousness. He was removed
from the small building by the other workers at the
location. The following day was a holiday, the 4th of
July. Mr. Williams was at home all day and was ill. He
complained of chest pains and difficulty in breathing,
and he stated that it was this powder and the poisonous
fumes therefrom that was causing the trouble. On July
5th he reported to the location but could not work due
to the chest pains and difficulty in breathing. That afternoon he went to the hospital at Cortez. This was Friday
that he was admitted to the hospital and he stayed until
Tuesday, July 9th. He was attended by Dr. Massion. He
left the hospital at Cortez on July 9th. He was not able
to return to work and still complained of pains in his
chest and difficulty in breathing." (R 15)
It would have been entirely proper for the medical
panel to give an apinon such as was given based on the
purported facts. But even the medical panel in its report
in the second paragraph states:
"It is to be noted that the only description of the
alleged injury is contained in your file in an unsigned
statement, presumably obtained by from the widow
by an attorney representing her. This was undated.
There was a briefer statement of alleged injury in
the application for hearing signed by the widow
about a year and a half after the alleged accident"
(R 37)
In the last paragraph of the same report, the Medical
Panel states,
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"It is to be emphasized that the opinion of the panel
is largely based upon and acceptance of the unsigned
statement that there was an exposure to parafonnaldehyde and that such exposure was in sufficient
degree to result in pneumonitis." (R 39).

Title 35-1-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Ameneded,
states ..... .
"And the Commission may base its findings and decisions on the report of the Panel but shall not be
bound by such report if there is other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a
contrary finding by the Commission .... "
In this case it is true that Earl Clark and LeRoy Ramey
testified to substantially the same material as was originally testified to the Plaintiff Mrs. Colita Williams, and
upon which the Medical Panel based its report. However,
a serious cloud is thrown over the testimony of Mrs.
Williams in that it was impossible for her to be present
at the time of the exposure, and the work record shows
that LeRoy Ramey was not on the job at all on the day
of the exposure, and that Earl Clark is a former husband
of Mrs. Williams. It is submitted that is is within the
discretion of the commission to select that evidence
which is the most credible and to use that evidence in
arriving at its decision. It is further noteworthy that the
medical panel itself based its decision on three probabilities and selected what was in the opinion, in the
light of the evidence submitted (being the unsigned
statement of Mrs. Williams) that one of these probabilities
was the most likely.
The Medical report of the panel could only be sustained
if the Commission found that the facts as related by the
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Plaintiff Mrs. Williams were substantially correct. The
manner and form of such evidence did not warrant such
credibility.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT IN ERROR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NOT A SCINTILLA OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF EXPOSURE TO PARAFORMALDEHYDE.
The question is not whether there was an exposure to
paraformaldehyde, but whether there was a sufficient
exposure to paraformaldehyde for a sufficient length of
time and in sufficient quantities to cause a chemically
induced pneumonia which could lead to the deceased's
death. Again, the entire basis of the testimony submitted
by the Plaintiffs and in behalf of the Plaintiffs was by
witnesses who are seriously subject to question in their
credibility as has been formerly set forth. It is interesting
to note that Dr. Massion of Cortez, who treated the patient
for a period of one week, was never advised by the patient
that he considered his illness a result of a chemical exposure. Neither did the doctors seen in Clovis, New
Mexico, or in Levelland, Texas, receive any such indication from the deceased. (R 7, 8, 9, 13, 126)
A letter to the Medical Panel from Dr. E. D. Barnes
stated that he saw Mr. Williams on July 14th, 1957, when
he gave a history of having had a sereve pain toward the
anterior part of the chest, radiating down the left arm
on July 4th, 1957 ... (R 126). No statement was made by
the deceased to Dr. Barnes of a chemical exposure.
Dr. Alan K. Done, upon being questioned concerning
paraformaldehyde, stated:
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". . this of course would depend upon the concentration. But it is intensely irritating, and would irritate all mucous membrances-including those of
the respiratory tract, the throat, the eyes, the nose-and would be extremely uncomforable. And acutely
so. Above and beyond this, it can leave residual
damage--in terms of damage to the tracheal bronchial tree, chronic bronchitis. It can lead to pneumonia, but usually does this only under circumstances where the exposure is truly overwhelming,
or is chronic and repeated. (R 144)
Q - As a matter of a hypothetical question, Doctor,

from your experience-and from what research
you may have done-do you have an opinoion
as to whether or not a person would be capable
of remaining in a condition of exposure to formaldehyde gas a sufficient duration, and remain
conscious, to receive acute effects as you have
just indicated? (R 144)

A - Yes. To receive sufficient exposure to have resulted in say pneumonia, I think it would have
been necessary for the individual to have been
exposed to such a degree that he would not
voluntarily stand by and allow it to continue.
In other words this material is sufficiently
irritating that anyone who was capable of doing
so would, I'm sure, immediately leave the area.
It is extremely irritating. So that hypothetically
the only conditions under which this is likely to
occur would be if the individual were confined
in such a way that he could not escape, or he
were overcome. (R 144, 145)

Q - .. Wouldn't his reaction to the gas itself be of

such a violent nature that he could not endure
it for long enough time to receive damage there-
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A Q -

A -

Q -

A Q -

A -

from?
From a single acute exposure, yes. Damage can
occur from lower exposure over a longer period
of time, and intermittent.
Now as a result of your research on this, did
did you check medical records back over a
period of time to determine if there had been
any previous occurences of pneumonitis chemically induced by this particular chemical?
I reviewed the medical and industrial health
literature going back 40 years, as well as is
possible to do so with the indices that are available at the present time, and found no similar
case reported in the medical literature.
Ref erring back to your previous answers before
that one, would a single exposure-as a hypothetical, or directly related to this case- would an
exposure of say an hour to an hour and a half or
possibly two hours' duration be as a single instance, in your opinion, be sufficient to induce
chemically a pneumonitis?
It could be. It would depend entirely upon the
concentration of formaldehyde in the atmosphere.
With such a concentration, would the individual
not be driven from the area before that occurred
but for the fact that say he was unconscious, or
was such that he could not escape the enclosure?
Such a concentration, in my opinion, would be
intolerable. (R 146, 147)

The Defendants respectfully submit that even if the
testimony taken from Clark and Ramey is given full
credibility, it does not show exposure to paraformalde·
hyde in a harmful concentration for a period of one and
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one-half hours. Dr. Done's testimony was to the effect
that such exposure would be so irritating that the
recipient could not stand such an exposure and would
not permit it unless he were unconscious.

POINT III
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT IN ERROR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPETENT MEDICAL
EVIDECE THAT EXPOSURE, IF ANY, CAUSED OR
CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEATH OF EARL RAE
WILLIAMS.
Dr. Massion of Cortez, Colorado, who attended the
deceased in the hospital and thereafter, stated: "I do
not remember if at the time he made any statement with
regard to having inhaled any material while at work. I
did not enter any comments he may have made at this
time in the hospital record." (R 7). It is interesting to note
that one of the important factors a in treating a patient
is in obtaining as full and complete medical history as is
possible and particularly the causes or apparent causes
of the illness being treated. It is logical to assume that
since the history of this illness was not noted as being
due to a chemical exposure, that is was felt to be due to
a bacterial infection by the doctor and by Mr. Williams
himself.
Dr. Massion proceeds: "I have been requested by Mrs.
Williams and one of her attorneys to state an opinion with
regard as to whether her husband's death was caused
by poisonous fumes or substances. I am unable to state
such an opinion since I have had no experience prior to
this with industrial poisons. It would be obvious to me
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that Mr. Williams underwent the usual course in evo.
lution of a bacterial lung infection. In view of the fact
that his fever rose to 104 degree, there must have been
such an infection present. I am unable to deny or confirm
that an inhaled toxin or poison would have aggravated or
perhaps initiated this process. I, however, failed to see '
any connection between possible poisoning and eventual
cause of death." (R 9).
Contrary to opinion of counsel for the Plaintiffs, it
would appear that this statement of Dr. Massion indicates
that he had no knowledge whatsoever of industrial
chemical poisoning and that it was his opinion that even
had there been some chemical poisoning, that this was
a bacterial pneumonia condition.
The only other doctor to treat the deceased was Dr. '
E. D. Barnes of Levelland, Texas, who advised .... "he
gave a history of having had severe pain over the
anterior part of the chest radiating down the left arm on
July 4th, 1957." (R 35). This is completely contrary to
anything reported by the Plaintiffs. Dr. Barnes stated
fuat the medical history that he had obtained was typical
of a coronary occulsion and this was his reason for at·
tributing Mr. Williams' death to that cause. (R 35)
The Medical Panel's report stated that "it is a legal,
rather than a medical, matter to determine whether the '
statements contained are admissable evidence. The Panel
must proceed with a medical opinion based upon the
assumption that these statements are acceptable in evi·
dence. The Panel further reports, "the data is so sketchy
for this interval between his seeing Dr. Massion on July
9th and his death on July 14th, that it is not possible for
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the panel to express a positive opinion as to the final
cause of death. There are three possibilities:
(1)

These had an acute exacerbation of an incompletely resolved pulmonary process, perhaps aggravated or incited by the fatigue of the
long automobile trip.
(2) That he had myocardial infarction based upon
coronary thrombosis and that this was independent of the preceding pulmonary illness.
(3) That he had a myocardial infarction which was
precipitated or aggravated by the preceding
pulmonary illness.
It appears to the Panel that of these three possibilities,
the first is more probable-namely that his death was
a result of an aggravation- of the previous pulmonary
condition." (R 39)
POINT IV

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT IN A CAPRICIOUS,
ARBITRARY AND UNUSUAL MANNER.
The Plaintiffs, in attacking the Industrial Commission,
for being negative and for having expressed that the
medical evidence pending in the case is negative, failed
to recognize that as of the date of those letters, February
24th, 1960, and March 25th, 1960, there was no evidence
whatsoever in the file of the commission except the
medical report from Cortez, Colorado, and a death
certificate.
Plaintiffs allege that the rehearing held August 12,
1964, did not produce any new experts, nor any new
evidence. The record shows the introduction of evidence
from Dr. Alan K. Done, who although he was consulted
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by the medical panel, did not previously testify, and who
provided substantial new evidence and convincing eyj.
dence concerning the toxic effects of paraformaldehyde
as set forth in Point II herein.
It was the intention of the Defendants to bring to the
hearing a Dr. J. F. Osterritter, Medical Director of the
Celanese Corporation of America, manufacturers of para- 1
formaldehyde. A letter from Dr. Osterritter is included
in the file (R 114) in which Dr. Osterritter states:
" .... the inhalation of formaldehyde vapor causes smarting of the eyes, nose and throat and is irritating so that
a person exposed will not long tolerate it and will leave
the area. If a person is capoble of remaining in an area
where there is formaldehyde vapor present, then the
concentration is not likely to be high enough to cause any
acute effects ... The only time a chemical pneumonitis or
pneumonia is likely to occur is when an individual comes
into contact with a very high concentration of for·
moldehyde; then there would be much coughing, choking
and watering of the eyes. Unless the working conditions
in the case in question were sudh that very high con·
centrations of formaldehyde were produced, the case '
that you described should not develop pneumonia or a
heart condition." (R 114).

The conclusions of Dr. J. F. Osterritter, M. D. were
much the same of those of Dr. Alan K. Done, adduced
in the rehearing and as quoted in Point II of this Brief.
In addition, there was introduced into evidence the
work an drilling record of the area which unequivoc·
ably demonstrated that the deceased and his crew had
worked on July 4th 1957. It further established this, not·
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withstanding the fact that the three witness who testified
for the Plaintiff, Earl Clark LeRoy Ramey and Colita
Williams testified that the crew did not work on July
4th. The record further demonstrated that on July 3rd,
1957, when the alleged exposure took place, LeRoy Ramey
did not report to work, and could not have been present
at the time of the exposure.
The Commission did not base its decision on hear say
evidence, because the employer's record is not heresay,
nor is the testimony of Dr. Alan R. K. Done or of the
medical panel. The Plaintiff in stating that the Commission must base its decision on some type of reasonably
substantial proof ignores the fact that it is the Plaintiff
who must establish her case by a reasonably substantial
proof, as the burden of proof is upon the Applicant to
establish her claim for compensation. Higbey vs. industrial Commission, 75 Utah 361, 285 Pacific 306;
Bingham Mines vs. Alsop 59 Utah 306 203 Pacific 644.
Where the Industrial Commission is driven to surmise
or conjecture, the injured person or his dependents cannot recover compensation benefits. The factfinder is not
bound to adopt the theory of the applicant, even if there
is some evidence to support it. Sugar vs. Industrial Commission 94 Utah 56, 75 Pacific 2nd 311.
Surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is not sufficient to justify a finding in behalf of the applicant.
Higbey vs. Industrial Commission 75 Utah 361 285 Pacific
306.
If there were no other testimony than that submitted
by the Plaintiffs, and if there were no reasonable alternatives, to the conclusions arrived at by' the Plaintiffs,
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and if the medical testimony were not speculative on the
occurrence of certain facts and certain conditions, it is
conceivable that the industrial Commission could have
held for the Plaintiffs.
In Pintar vs. Industrial Commission of Utah and
Geneva Steel Division of U.S. Steel Corporation, 14
Utah 2nd 276, 382 Pacific 2nd 414, the Court states on
p. 415, "the difficulty with Plaintiff's position is that
there is other evidence which supports the view adopted
by the Commission, whose perogative it is to determine
the facts."
In Burton vs. Industrial Commission 13 Utah 2nd, 353
27 4 Pacific 2nd, 439 this Court said on page 554, "In order
to reverse the findings and order made, the Plaintiff must
show that there is such credible, uncontradicted evidence
in her favor that the Commission's refusal to so find was
capricious and arbitrary. See also Morris vs. Industrial
Commission 90 Utah 56, 61 Pacific 2nd 415. "The Com·
mission could reasonable disbelieve the Plaintiff's story
that his physical problems where the result of the in·
cident described by him."
CONCLUSION - We respectfully submit that the pro·
ceeding of the Industrial Commission were properly con·
ducted and that the Commisison reached the proper
conclusion and result from the evidence there presented.
The decision and order of the Commission should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CANNON, DUFFIN & PACE
Lorin N. Pace
19 W. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
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